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ARGUMENT
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENT'S ASSERTIONS, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THERE HAD OCCURRED A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT AN INCREASE IN CHILD
SUPPORT.
In her reply brief, plaintiff-respondent relies in total
on testimony relating to deposits made to appellants personal
and business checking account for calendar year 1986.
The evidence at trial was that a substantial majority of
deposits to appellant's personal checking account represented
loans from his personal line of credit, which funds were either
used to consolidate or pay off existing debt or which funds
were deposited to the business cheeking account to sustain his
accounting practice during slow economic times.

These deposits

from his personal checking account to his business checking
account overstated his cash receipts significantly and created
the duplicate deposits ignored by both the court and counsel
for respondent.

The evidence further shows that when loans

were subsequently repaid, the monies were transferred from
appellant's
business
account
his BYU.
personal checking
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account, from which checks were drawn to re-pay the lending
institution, again resulting in duplicate deposits.
As irrelevant as bank deposits are to the issue of "gross
income," respondent failed to produce any evidence of bank
deposits for appellant's personal and business checking
accounts for calendar year 1984, the year of the divorce.

In

fact the only comparable evidence regarding the income of both
appellant and respondent at the time of the divorce trial was
appellants monthly draw of $2,349.00 and respondent gross
monthly income of $537*00.

Furthermore, the only evidence

presented at the modification trial was that respondent's
income had increased to $1,421.00 per month and that
appellant's monthly gross income was $1,242.00.
Although respondent relies on appellants 1983 income tax
return to justify a finding of a substantial change in
circumstances, the record reflects that the information
contained in appellant's 1983 tax return was neither available
nor was the return prepared nor filed until 30 days after entry
of the Amended Decree of Divorce . This substantiates the fact
that the court, in establishing appellant's obligation to pay
child support and alimony at the time of the divorce relied on
appellant's draw of $2,349.00 as contained in his Exhibit 19.
Plaintiff as the petitioning party has the burden to
prove a substantial change in circumstances.
Mitchel, 668 P2d 561 (Utah 1983).

Mitchel v.

She failed in that burden.

Even the court recognized how far afield it had gone when it
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admitted at p. 43 of the partial Transcript that it "did not
know how to approach this case".
The court further demonstrated its obvious disregard for
present case law when at a post trial hearing to hear
appellant's objections to proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law the court admitted "I don't think there's
any authority for this kind of conclusion that I came to when I
heard this evidence."

(Transcript of Hearing, P. 11 LL 3-9)

The courts finding of a substantial change in circumstances in
this case is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (1988)
Counsel for respondent incorrectly represents that the
Christiansen case cited in his brief stands for the proposition
that if a person owns his own business and he co-mingles
personal funds with his business accounts, that the court may
consider both the individual income and business income in
considering a petition for modification of child support.
Christiansen vs. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 529 (Utah 1983).
That is not the rule set out in Christiansen, nor are the
facts of the Christiansen case comparable to the case at issue
here.

In the Christiansen case the court was concerned with a

corporation which was wholly owned by one of the parties to the
divorce.

As a corporation, the business filed separate tax

returns and showed a profit as an entity separate and apart
from it's owner.

In the case now before the court, the

business of appellant is a proprietorship.

As such all of the

income of the business and all of the expenses of the business
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are reflected on appellant's personal income tax return.

At

the time of trial, none of the expenses reflected on
appellant's tax return were questioned or objected to by either
counsel for respondent or by the court.

Appellant agrees that

the current state of the law in Utah is that the court can take
into consideration in it's deliberations of whether there has
been a substantial change in circumstances, the value of any
direct financial benefits a party may receive from his
personally owned business.

No such evidence was presented at

the time of the modification trialr however.

The only evidence

regarding appellant's current gross income at the time of the
modification trial was his 1986 income tax return, which
reflected a gross income for the year in the amount of
$14,907.68.
Respondent offered no evidence regarding any financial
benefit appellant was or presently is receiving from his
personally owned accounting business.

Because the court had

apparently made up it's mind to arbitrarily increase
appellant's child support obligation, it read into the record
facts and evidence which either were not offered at the trial
or were irrelevant to the proceedings.
Even if the court had sufficient evidence to conclude that
appellants income had increased significantly, such an increase
in income alone does not automatically justify an increase in
his child support obligations Owen v. Owen, 579 P2d 911 (Utah).
CONCLUSIONS
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In it's ruling, without any evidence to substantiate it's
conclusion, the court accused appellant of maintaining a high
standard of living.

It based that conclusion on (1)

appellant's ownership of real and personal property all of
which appellant was awarded at the time of the original divorce
decree, and none of which contributes income to assist
appellant in paying his court ordered child support, and (2)
the court's perception of appellant's past ability to borrow
money, which to date has never been justification for
increasing a non-custodial parent's child support obligation.
The evidence does not support a finding of a substantial
change in circumstances.

Furthermore, as a separate issue, the

evidence does not justify an increase in child support, even if
there is a finding that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances.
Furthermore, the trial court's notion that a parent's
ability to borrow should be a factor in determining his or her
ability to pay child support is novel indeed.

Needless to say

that if that now becomes the standard for determining a
parent's ability to pay child support, then in accordance with
Ebbert, a parent's credit worthiness would be tantamount to
imputing the wealth and income of appellant's creditors to
appellant.

Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah).

That is

not the law in Utah nor would such an interpretation of the law
be in the best interest of children entitled to support from
their parents.
Respectfully submitted this fty

day of January, 1989.
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